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Abstract 
 
Our chapter focuses on the presentation of countries, their political actors and 
institutions in the context of the Greek sovereign debt crisis in Greek media from 
2009 to 2012. We examine opinion pieces from journalists, experts and public 
intellectuals published in Greek newspapers, and identify how they present the 
debt crisis and the involved political actors and institutions. We employ content 
and discourse analysis, focusing on the reputation and stereotypical perceptions 
of Germany, Greece and the European Union (EU). We also identify blame 
attribution frames, which underpin the public’s confidence in domestic and EU 
actors and institutions. This chapter contributes to the systematic understanding 
of public opinion, attitudes towards European integration, European identity and 
citizenship.  
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Introduction 
 
The ongoing institutional and economic crisis of the EU has created new 
stereotypes, as well as facilitated the return of old prejudices across the Member 
States, with important implications for the future of European integration. The 
crisis has generated broad media coverage challenging the reputations of 
countries most affected by the recession and those who bear the financial burden 
of bailouts. Characteristically, Greece has been often described as the ‘sick man of 
Europe’ (Exadaktylos and Zahariadis, 2014), while references to ‘the sinking 
Euro’, ‘lazy Greeks’, ‘hard-working Germans’ and ‘detached Brits’ are frequently 
hosted in headlines, news reports and editorial commentary in newspapers 
across Europe (e.g. Der Spiegel, 2011; EU Observer, 2011; Forbes, 2011; The 
Economist, 2011).  
Here, we offer a snapshot analysis of public opinion that is complementary to 
existing media analysis studies and public opinion surveys that focus on the 
Greek debt crisis. We examine the representations of its protagonists, focusing 
on how Greece, Germany and the EU have been discussed in opinion pieces 
published in Greek print media. We focus particularly on Greece and Germany 
because in recent polls like the one by Pew Research Center in May 2012 (eight 
EU countries and the United States), Greece and Germany held polar opposite 
scores on economic performance, leader evaluations, and perceptions of being 
hard-working. 
We draw insights from political psychology and political economy debates 
involving the processes that explain how elites and citizens reach their 
judgments in times of crisis. Our content and discourse analysis focuses on how 
Greece and Germany are stereotyped using old and new characterizations, how 
economic evaluations of success or failure and also blame are presented/framed 
in the context of the financial crisis, and how citizens and elites engage with the 
crisis and its protagonists. We also seek to examine how particular countries, 
their political leaders, national institutions and citizens are discussed as part of 
the problem or the solution. We also look at support for the EU and its 
institutions, and prospective assessments of a common future.  
This study is timely for understanding public opinion dynamics within and 
beyond Greece–what started as a debt crisis in Europe in 2008, transformed into 
a currency crisis compromising the stability and value of the Euro, and evolved 
into a crisis of confidence in financial institutions, lack of trust in political 
organizations and leaders, financial and personal hardship for millions of citizens 
in (mainly) South Europe and fuelled fears, angry protests and uncertainty that 
are alive and growing today (Featherstone 2011).  
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Mediated Representations: Setting the Crisis Agenda 
 
In the context of crises, citizens seek information from the media and their social 
circle in order to form their opinions, stay updated with current developments, 
relieve their uncertainty and assuage their fears. As they search for relevant 
information, they turn to familiar sources for reassurance, use shortcuts like 
their party identification to narrow their information search, and engage with 
the opinions of political and media elites and public intellectuals, which gives 
them a sense of ‘doing something’ (Graber 2009; Graber 2010; Zaller, 1992).  
The presentation of crises in the media is often marked by three stages, not 
always clearly separated, and often with significant overlap. During the first 
stage, the crisis is announced, the number of news broadcasts on the topic 
increases, the facts are rehashed again and again, citizens seek to gain as many 
details as possible, and public officials and experts speculate about the causes. 
During the second stage, media attempt to place the situation in perspective, 
damage estimates are more accurate, governments try to shape interpretations 
and avoid political fallout, and citizens seek to formulate a coherent story of the 
event. The third stage is marked by attempts by media and public officials to 
place the issue into a long-term perspective and promote events that sustain 
morale, like fund-raising concerts or sport events, and citizens seek information 
on how to cope with the aftermath or the prolonged nature of the crisis (Graber 
2010). By looking at how a crisis is presented in the media we should be able to 
identify quantitative and also qualitative changes in the types of coverage of the 
story over time.  
Here we are interested in representations of the crisis in newspapers’ opinion 
pieces and here is why. Although regularly the majority of citizens prefer 
television as a source of political information, (Eurobarometer 76, 2011), 
research on media use demonstrates that particularly in times of crisis citizens 
hungry for in-depth analysis turn to newspapers for their interpretations of 
events into coherent stories (Graber 2001, 2010; Nimmo and Combs, 1985; 
Singer and Endreny, 1993; Walters, Wilkins and Walters 1989). The study of 
newspaper content allows us to examine the material citizens rely on as they 
assess where the fault lies during a crisis.  
Newspaper opinion pieces in particular, offer a sense of ‘closer to the public’ 
view of the events. They host interpretations, explanations, and justifications of 
particular points of view offered by political personalities, experts, public 
intellectuals, or engaged citizens and serve multiple functions: they allow 
average citizens to feel a sense of mutual support, that their fears, worries and, 
often, suffering is shared. They also raise questions about responsibility, pose 
inflammatory accusations, or heighten feelings of hate, danger, and gloom, and 
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growing panic among public audiences. They are also good indicators of the 
complexity of discussions in which opinion shapers, elites, and public 
intellectuals engage, respond and reflect on.  
In addition, newspaper opinion pieces bridge media and public agendas. 
According to Rogers and Dearing (1988), media agendas reflect the most 
extensively covered media content, while public agendas reflect citizens’ 
perceptions of what is important and set the standards on the basis of which 
governments are often judged. Opinion pieces contain public agendas as they are 
produced by citizens than media elites. Media and public agendas are distinct 
from policy, or political, agendas that reflect decisions and actions of political 
elites. And while public perceptions of what is important are often determined 
by media agendas, Wright (1986) notes that they are also affected by 
conversations with others regarding social and political issues. These 
conversations often take place in opinion pieces, so effectively opinion pieces can 
reflect the nature of public discussions on an issue. McLeod, Becker and Byrnes 
(1974) concur that content presented in mass media has greater effect in 
shaping perceptions among individuals who engage in interpersonal 
communication about the topics in the media agenda. Opinion pieces are 
products of highly engaged citizens so monitoring the content of opinion pieces, 
we can get a good sense of the heated debates and emotionally arousing 
interpretations that often surround highly impactful, dramatic, and contested 
political issues such as the one we examine here—the Greek sovereign debt 
crisis. Below we review briefly the main characteristics of the Greek sovereign 
debt crisis, and generate our hypotheses regarding its presentation.  
 
The timeline of the crisis  
 
Characteristics of the Greek political system such as clientelism, populism, weak 
democratic institutions and civil society (Featherstone, 2011; Mitsopoulos and 
Pelagidis, 2011; Mouzelis and Pagoulatos, 2002; Pappas, 2013) have been seen 
as paramount determinants of the Greek economic breakdown in the context of 
the global economic crisis. Moreover, recent IMF admissions that it 
underestimated the damaging implications of austerity measures on Greece 
(Stevis and Talley, 2013) raise questions about the impact of austerity on the 
political and social systems of affected countries. Nonetheless, the advent of the 
crisis, led to dramatic changes in the dynamics of the Greek political system with 
the creation of the co-operation government in November 2011 and the resulting 
coalition government of June 2012 (Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou, 2013). 
The phases of the Greek debt crisis and the emotionally loaded content of 
accompanied news headlines in leading newspapers have been extensively 
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discussed by Davou and Demertzis (2013). In its early stages (December 2009 to 
May 2010) the Greek crisis is characterized as the worst development in Greek 
history since the 1949 civil war and was presented in the media by headlines 
stressing the shock, and traumatic nature of the crisis. In its second phase (June 
2010–December 2011), the assimilation of the crisis reflected in anger and 
frustration in public sentiment was expressed as public demonstration and 
protests, and also hope and optimism. During its third phase (from early 2012 
onwards), Greece experiences a growing recession and demonstrated inability of 
political system to deal with the crisis, expressed in the media by headlines 
reflecting lack of hope, sense of helplessness and meaninglessness, but also a 
sense of gained efficacy after the results of the general elections.  
In our study we follow a similar timeline, and also pay particular attention to 
developments during six critical junctures (December 2009, May 2010, June 
2010, November 2011, May 2012 and June 2012). These occasions are important 
for our study because we also expect them to correlate with an over-exposure of 
Germany and the EU in the press. The first three instances are pinned upon the 
unravelling of the crisis in Greece (December 2009) leading to the signing of the 
first bailout agreement (Memorandum of Understanding) in May 2010 and the 
protests that followed (June 2010). During this time we expect a concentration of 
opinion pieces not on the solutions of the problem but rather in making 
generalizations about corruption, patronage, easy money and non-deserved state 
benefits. It is our hypothesis that the reported external pressures and the 
internal debates were focused more on perceptions of the crisis by the public 
and the political elites. In other words, who’s the good, who’s the bad and who’s 
the ugly. During this time we also expect to find a strong demarcation of ‘them’ 
versus ‘us’ in the way media stories discuss the events. It is interesting to seek 
empirical evidence to test this hypothesis further since the ‘them’ vs. ‘us’ frame 
could have also penetrated public policy-making and the decision-making 
processes of political elites across Europe.  
The other three occasions (November 2011, May 2012 and June 2012) are 
important because then we expect to see the coverage of external pressures for 
reform and an increased presentation of the images of Germany and their 
political elites. We also expect to identify a confrontational approach to Europe, 
centered around the “in” or “out” debate, and the targeting of certain EU member 
states seen as strong (Germany, France), as being systemically opposed or having 
a strong view against other member states seen as week (Spain, Italy, Ireland). 
We also expect a strong division between North and South, intense public 
debates and polemic entering a vicious cycle of who is to blame for the crisis, 
who owes whom, who rightfully belongs to Europe and who doesn’t. November 
2011 coincides with the Greek PM’s intention to hold a referendum over the 
sovereign debt bailout and scenarios for potential EU exit. May and June 2012 
are the periods of the two electoral contests in Greece—this is when we expect 
6 
 
external perceptions of domestic political elites to penetrate the political debate 
reflecting priorities beyond policy implementation—more towards saving face 
on international partners. Our last time point is the elections of June 2012, that 
coincide with the end of a two-party system in Greece and the shrinking of one of 
the two traditional parties (PASOK) within the political system.  
To understand the impact of this crisis on Greek public opinion we examine the 
determinants of citizens’ political judgments focusing on stereotypes, the 
salience and frequency of presentation of institutions and political actors, and 
the dominant frames of blame.  
 
Stereotypes: how preconceptions influence perceptions of the crisis 
 
We are interested in the content of stereotypical thinking – the images, 
metaphors, generalizations used to depict involved countries, their citizens, 
institutions and political leaders because stereotypes allow us to simplify the 
complexity of the political and social environment, and focus of particular 
attributes of a target. Political psychology research demonstrates that 
stereotypes act as heuristics, carrying easily accessible and affectively laden 
information about a particular target, and help us reach evaluations and 
decisions quickly and effortlessly. Committing to particular stereotypical 
perceptions allows for cognitive and affective biases that bolster the particular 
interpretation/stereotype, and lead to cognitive closure and discounting of new 
or challenging information (Janis and Mann, 1997; Kinder, 2013; Ottati and 
Wyer, 1993; Wyer and Ottati, 1993). In the context of the financial crisis, we 
often come across characterizations of counties and their people as lazy, 
hardworking, honest, reliable, ignorant, arrogant, warm or cold-hearted—it is 
interesting to map the systematic patterns of how Greece and Germany are 
discussed, which characteristics are attributed to their institutions, leaders and 
citizens, and how these are internalized by Greek audiences. 
There is significant value in examining these stereotypes closely. Asch (1952) 
showed that perceptions of others as ‘cold’, ‘warm’, ‘smart’ or ‘lazy’ affect 
meaning attached to their remaining features or attributed behaviors. Boulding 
(1959) noted that seeing other countries as ‘strong’ or ‘weak’, ‘hostile’ or 
‘friendly’ had significant implications in determining behaviors towards these 
countries; Scott (1965) highlighted how such perceptions provoke particular 
emotions; Cottam (1977) expanded on the perceived threats and opportunities 
generated by stereotypical characterizations; and Haslam (2006) discussed the 
frequent demonization of the ‘powerful’ and dehumanization of those perceived 
as ‘unable to solve their own problems’. 
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Stereotypes can alter the human basis of the other (Herrmann, 2013). When 
civility and rationality are removed, others start resembling animals or 
barbarians; and when warmth and openness are erased by stereotypical 
thinking, the other is thought of as a machine (Alexander, Brewer, and 
Herrmann, 1999). Herrmann and Fischerkeller (1995) linked stereotypical 
judgments with perceptions of trustworthiness, and perceived likelihood that 
agreements would be honored in times of war or conflict. A number of studies 
also demonstrate that schematic thinking promoted by stereotypes and 
preconceptions shape how cues from the environment are interpreted, affect the 
search for new information (Fiske and Taylor, 1991; Sherman, Judd, and Park, 
1989) and shape policy support at the public level (Herrmann, 1986; Peffley and 
Hurwitz, 1992; Tetlock, 1999).  
 
Salience of institutions and political actors in the blame game 
 
Political, economic and social institutions that facilitate or constrain political 
action (elections, parliamentary procedures, central banks and credit agencies or 
courts) are at heart of important political developments. In addition, political 
actors such as ministers, MPs, and political leaders play a crucial role in 
describing political events, and shape discourses of blame. The interaction 
between institutions and political actors becomes the focal point of media and 
public discourses. Monitoring the frequency and tone of their presentation, one 
can identify the focus of the debate at different points in time.  
In the context of the crisis it is also valuable to examine perceptions of the EU. 
Analysis of press coverage in particular member states uncovers important 
information on how citizens see the future of the EU, national economies and 
prospective evaluations of economic performance of the country and its EU 
neighbors (De Vreese, 2001; Peter, Semetko and De Vreese, 2003). Financial 
markets rely significantly on citizens’ and experts’ expectations; hence 
examining this influence of the news is undeniable, particularly in times of crisis. 
Questions of EU identity and membership become part of this debate. Besides 
the economic pressures imposed on EU member states, the symbolic 
representations of being a ‘member of the European family’ carry significant 
weight in understanding how citizens perceive the future of the EU and their 
future within the EU.  
Blame, particularly during crises and other negative events like scandals or 
natural catastrophes is not static—multiple actors, including political and media 
elites are active participants in the blame attribution game. They often promote 
different interpretations and attempt to deflect blame (Kinder and Sanders, 
1990; Weaver, 1986). For example, research on institutional scandals indicates 
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that when blame is shifted to endemic characteristics of an institution, the 
institution absorbs the negative impact of the scandal and the culpability of 
individuals is discounted (Capelos and Wurzer, 2009). Lasorsa and Reese (1990) 
provide an interesting example of blame spreading by the media during the 
October 1987 stock market crash, and here, we are interested in identifying the 
dominant blame frames during the Greek debt crisis.  
Vasilopoulou, Halikiopoulou and Exadaktylos (2014) provide a valuable 
reference point. They conducted a framing analysis of Greek party leaders’ 
speeches and identified six categories that were frequently used as blame 
shifting strategies from different actors (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007). The blame 
for the crisis was placed on different targets depending on the position of the 
party in the party system. The most frequent targets were the party of 
government (PASOK) prime minister and its ministers; the main opposition 
party (ND), its leader and MPs; both parties (PASOK and ND); external elites and 
actors such as the EU, the USA, IMF, or specific EU member states; domestic and 
external, mentioning all of the above; specific interest groups, specific to Greece 
or external, such as banks, industries, corporations, or rating agencies. In our 
analysis, we adopt their typology to examine whether the political blame-shifting 
strategies match the blame frames that appear in opinion pieces over the same 
period.  
Methodology and data 
 
Our data was collected by a content analysis of opinion pieces published in the 
online edition of the Greek newspaper To Vima. The online edition index is 
available at the newspaper website (www.tovima.gr). We considered the online 
edition of the newspaper as complementary to the print version as there is a 
strict editorial process in place. To Vima has a center-left affiliation, and this may 
be seen as a limitation. However, the newspaper hosts opinions and experts from 
the wider political ideological spectrum, our sample of opinion pieces is of good 
size, demonstrates a variance of opinions, and provides a solid starting point for 
further analysis of opinion pieces in additional sources.  
A search of the online index using the keyword ‘German*’ (‘Γερμαν*’) between 
December 2009 and July 2012 yielded a large number of hits which were then 
assessed for relevance to the Greek debt crisis. We excluded irrelevant items as 
well as permanent editorial columns and reproduction of articles that appeared 
elsewhere or in foreign sources. We then ordered the retrieved pieces 
chronologically around the six time points (December 2009, May 2010, June 
2010, November 2011, May 2012 and June 2012). For each of the selected time 
points, we used all the relevant pieces appearing in the first and third week 
starting from Monday to the following Monday. The count of articles per time 
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point is available in the last column of Table 1. The final coded sample contains 
69 opinion pieces (44,388 words in total). Our coding accounts for variables 
capturing presentation of actors and institutions, and also related stereotypes 
and blame attributions.  
*** Please insert Table 1 here *** 
To assess presentation we coded for size (count of words per piece), overall tone 
(positive, negative, neutral) and complexity of argument (simple, complex). 
Complexity involves the ‘why, how, who, what, and where’. As ‘simple’ we 
classified items including generalizations and descriptions of facts or comments 
from others. As ‘complex’ we coded items that contained reasoning that went 
beyond the simple presentation of facts. A complex statement offers a variety of 
points of view, makes comparisons, connects several points, or discusses 
consequences, as indication of in-depth reasoning.  
To account for content we tallied the frequency of mentions of Greece, Germany 
other countries, the amount and type of coverage received by political actors and 
specific domestic and international personalities, as well the frequency of 
references to specific institutions. Stereotype words like hardworking, lazy, 
corrupt, honest, were identified per article and were then tallied by country and 
time point to identify over-time patterns. We also coded whether the pieces were 
in favor or against EU membership, and whether they adopted particular blame 
frames (government, opposition, the political system in general, external actors 
only, domestic and external actors, and interest groups) to draw comparisons 
with Vasilopoulou, et al. (2014).  
Analysis and findings 
 
The pieces we coded ranged from 272 to 1759 words and were on average about 
652 words long. The most frequent size was about 437 words, which is long 
enough to allow for comprehensive discussions of the crisis. Shorter pieces were 
targeted on specific news items rather than a fully-fledged analysis of facts. 
While the majority of pieces had mixed tone (61%), containing both positive and 
negative references and arguments, about 30% were pessimistic and a small 
number (9%) were optimistic that the crisis would be favorably resolved. This 
finding is in line with the findings of Davou and Demertzis (2013) which 
highlight emotional reactions to the crisis in media and public opinion reflecting 
the overall sentiment of fear, uncertainty, and anger. Appreciating that emotions 
condition the way citizens think and act about politics (Capelos 2010a; Capelos 
2010b; Capelos 2013) we also coded the emotional content of opinion pieces in 
our study. Results of our analysis will be presented in our future research.  
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Focusing on the types of arguments put forward, the details provided, and the 
factors considered in opinion pieces, we classified them as simple vs. complex. 
Interestingly, opinion shapers in their majority provide audiences with simple 
opinions about 58% of the time. Complex articles were featured less 
prominently, about 42% of the time. Simple articles were also on average shorter 
in size (550 words) compared to complex articles (791 words), and this 
difference is statistically significant (p <=.05). This difference is size is also 
reflected in the range of simple articles from 272 to 969 words, and complex 
articles from 362 to 1759 words and demonstrates that sophisticated accounts 
of the crisis require more elaborate presentations than simplified, shorter 
reactions.  
The distribution of complexity over time is also noteworthy. While 60% of 
opinion pieces provide simple reviews in December 2009, complexity of 
presentation increases as the crisis unfolds. By May 2010, 63% of opinion pieces 
provide a complex discussion increasing to 77% by June 2010. This is not 
surprising given the complexity of the proposed solution to the crisis offered by 
the government and the EU. It reflects the efforts of opinion shapers to explain 
links and interactions within negotiations. In November 2011, about 57% of the 
articles provide complex arguments, with simple opinion pieces gaining more 
ground (43%), showing an interesting division between those who consider the 
solution simple (e.g. a new government) or more complex (e.g. potential exit and 
its implications). The balance of complexity shifts again in May and June 2012, 
where above 85% of the articles provide simple arguments, in an effort perhaps 
to assist voters in their choices and political orientation during the national 
elections.  
References to particular countries  
 
The discussion of the Greek debt crisis does not hold a Greek-only focus. 
Characteristically, only 9% of the cases examine the Greek debt crisis as a 
national-only matter. Germany featured prominently, and appeared in about 
80% of the 69 reviewed articles, while France came second in mentions 
populating about 32% of the articles. The discussion regarding the financial 
crisis also expanded to other crisis-stricken countries, such as Spain and Italy 
(each at 19%), and Portugal and Ireland (9%) particularly in later points of the 
timeline. The US was mentioned ad hoc (25%), but always in conjunction with 
references to Germany. 
The focus on Germany was particularly strong. In about 16% of the opinion 
prices the discussion focused entirely on the Greek debt crisis in relation to 
Germany. Germany was also mentioned about 31% of the time in conjunction 
with one other country, in most cases France, and in 24% a third country was 
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mentioned. Several EU members are part of the crisis conversation, and as we 
will note later on, very often are considered to also be part of the problem.  
Another interesting finding is how the discussion of relevant countries 
developed over time. References to Germany were few in December 2009 (5%), 
doubled in May 2010 (9%) and topped in June 2010 and November 2011. These 
are periods of extreme unrest and instability in Greece and public attention was 
on Germany as the power that moved things in Europe. Our data, as well as other 
studies on media coverage of this period (Bee and Chrona, 2013) concur that the 
bailout agreement was perceived as a German-style occupation in Greece and the 
protests of June 2010 placed Germany in center-stage for the Greek predicament. 
Following what many saw as the dictation of policy-making and the interference 
of German politicians in the decision of Prime Minister Papandreou in November 
2011 to hold a referendum for the new bailout package, Germany found itself 
again in the forefront of the discussions. Since November 2011, Germany was 
established as a key actor to the crisis, and opinion pieces ensured it was 
mentioned from then onwards. 
References to France appeared later, especially during the French Presidency of 
the EU and the Cannes European Council (November 2011), when the Greek 
Prime Minister announced his intention to hold a referendum. Angela Merkel and 
Nicolas Sarkozy agreed to tell Greece not to hold a referendum and threatened a 
Greek exit from the EU. That joint decision tied France and Germany together in 
the eyes of opinion shapers. Most interestingly, France re-emerged in May and 
June 2012, during the Greek elections. This is mostly due to the election of the 
new French President, Francois Hollande, a socialist, who was perceived as 
someone who could control the advent of German austerity in Europe, thus 
renewing hope to the EU and adding value to an alternative solution to the crisis.  
Domestic and External Actors featured in the Greek Debt Crisis: 
density of coverage and over-time analysis.  
 
First, we looked at the presentation density for the actors featured as relevant in 
the conversations about the Greek debt crisis. About 22% of opinion pieces were 
targeted towards one actor. However, the majority of pieces (55.1%) involved 
between 2 and 4 actors, and these considered the causes and/or consequences of 
the crisis. Characteristically, pieces categorized as complex mentioned on 
average 3 actors, in contrast to 2 actors mentioned on average in simple pieces, 
and this difference is statistically significant at p ≤ .05. This is an important result 
as it demonstrates the complexity not only of the Greek debt crisis in terms of 
political and economic interactions, but also the complexity of the arguments put 
forward by public discourse.  
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To identify the focus of the discussions involving political actors we coded them 
into two categories: domestic and external. Opinion pieces focused on domestic-
only actors about 31% of the time, and external-only actors by 33%. The 
majority of opinion pieces (36%) included references to both domestic and 
external actors, again pointing to the crisis being seen as a development that 
implicates Greece as well as its European counterparts.  
Looking at over-time trends, we noted an interesting shift in the selection of 
actors. In December 2009, 20% of mentions involved domestic actors while 80% 
involved both domestic and external. By May 2010 the focus on domestic actors 
intensified (50%), external only references moved from 0 to 13%, while about 
38% of the articles highlighted both domestic and external actors. Following the 
intense demonstrations in Athens, by June 2010 there was a shift from domestic 
(17%) to external only actors (33%), while mentions on the combination of 
external and domestic actors peaked at 50%. By the prime ministerial 
resignation and the new cooperation government in November 2011, the focus 
turned on domestic-only actors (46%) and less on external-only (15%). 
Combined references were featured again in about 39% of the cases. By the 
electoral contests of May and June 2012, we noted a strong polarization in the 
presentation of actors in the comment pieces. In May 2012, 40% focused on 
domestic-only actors, while 47% identified external-only actors. Combined 
references dropped to 13%. The above can be seen as an indicator of the 
pressures posed by the European Union for a solution to the political deadlock. 
Following the electoral contest of June 2012, when a clear mandate was given to 
the pro-European ‘camp’ we observed a strong shift towards external-only 
references (75%). This can be attributed to the rhetoric applied by the leading 
party in the coalition government for renegotiation of the bailout terms, in its 
efforts to counter the accusations posed by the left for collaboration with 
external actors. About 25% of the opinion pieces held references to domestic 
actors, but always in conjunction with external.  
Specific Actors and their perceived role in the crisis  
 
Further to the domestic/external distinction, we classified specifically mentioned 
actors using seven dominant categories: Domestic Political Leaders (38%), 
Domestic Political Parties (28%), National Government (20%), EU Actors (17%), 
Political Elites (as a group or as ‘politicians’) (16%), Foreign Investors and 
Markets (12%), Press and Media (16%), and Interest and Social groups (17%). 
Our over-time analysis highlighted some particularly interesting patterns that 
deserve mention.  
The majority of references to domestic political leaders can be found during June 
2010 and November 2011 (both at 28%). Both periods were marked by a 
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heightened call for the leaders of the two major parties in Greek parliament 
(PASOK and ND) to reach some sort of compromise regarding the 
implementation of the bailout measures (June 2010) and the consolidation of a 
cooperation government in November 2011. This does not mean, as we will see 
later, that other political leaders of parliamentary parties are left out of the 
conversation.  
Parties are dominant actors in the Greek political scene. Mentions to political 
parties and their role in the crisis were evident in May 2010 (21%) when the 
bailout agreement was ratified and party whips came out. References increased 
to 32% by November 2011 when opinion shapers called for political parties to 
step away from ideological fault-lines and find a shared solution in the form of a 
cooperation government. References to parties peaked in May 2012, by 37%. 
This is when the first round of national elections took place and opinion polls 
and results demonstrated the fragmentation of the electorate across a number of 
less traditional parties, and the emergence of new ones, especially on the 
extreme right of the political spectrum.  
We also witnessed increased references to Government in December 2009 and 
November 2011 (both by 29%). It is also important to note that 21% of 
references to national government appeared in June 2010, after the height of the 
violent protests against the bailout agreement, highlighting the perceived 
responsibility of this actor for responding to social unrest.  
Emphasis on EU actors was also mainly present during December 2009 and 
November 2011, where about 25% of the EU mentions appeared in each of these 
two months. This is not a surprise since public and media attention was placed 
on the efforts of the EU to resolve the Greek debt crisis by agreeing on a bailout 
(December 2009) and then dealing with the prospect of a referendum for the 
second bailout agreement during the Cannes European Council meeting 
(November 2011).  
While general references to political elites were absent in the early stages of the 
crisis (December 2009) they rose to 18% by November 2011, when opinion 
shapers called for cooperation between all political elites in the country. 
References to political elites peaked in May and June 2012 (both at 27%) 
reflecting the deliberations to form a coalition government following the results 
of the two elections.  
The majority of mentions to foreign investors and markets were in December 
2009 (50%) and then November 2011 (25%). This reflects the attention paid by 
opinion shapers to the lack of confidence in the Greek program and/or proposed 
European resolution. While the focus during the early stages of the crisis was on 
the financial details of the story, it evolved to include more complicated 
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discussions, diffusing the conversation away from financial to other types of 
political actors.  
The role of the media is also discussed in the first phase of the crisis. In 
December 2009 and May 2010, references to press and media organizations 
reached 27%. In subsequent months they dropped to 18%, and 9% by June 2012. 
Opinion pieces reacted to the representations of the Greek crisis internationally, 
but also to the reporting style of media organizations (both domestic and 
international), underlining their responsibility in framing the crisis, and 
providing balanced assessments of the situation on the ground. As we will see 
further below, this is important as it affects the way public discourse was shaped 
in the latter part of the period we examine, with the reproduction of particular 
stereotypes that originated in imported discourses. 
References to interest and other social groups gradually increased as the crisis 
unfolded, from 8% in December 2009 and May 2010, to 17% in June 2010, to 
25% in November 2011, peaking in May 2012 at 33%. This incremental attention 
to this political actor coincides with measures to tackle the fiscal deficit and the 
implementation of actions to restructure the public sector and reform pensions 
and the welfare state (Exadaktylos and Zahariadis, 2014). It is also aligned with 
the number of protests that took place in Athens and other major cities across 
the country, and the attempts of political parties to capitalize on the vulnerability 
of citizens affected by the crisis (Davou and Demertzis, 2013).  
Political Personalities: the protagonists of the crisis 
 
Turning to specific domestic and international political personalities we found 
that about 26% of opinion pieces hosted references only to domestic 
personalities, 30% focused on international ones, and 32% attempted a link 
between domestic and international actors. About 22% of simple pieces included 
references to domestic personalities only, 41% provided references to only 
external actors, and 38% mentioned both internal and external actors. As we will 
see later, this focus on external actors in simple pieces can be related to the 
presence of more stereotype terms used. Turning to complex pieces, we see a 
reversal in focus, with 40% of pieces highlighting the role of domestic actors, and 
25% discussing only external actors. About 36% included references to both 
domestic and external actors. The consistently high presence of references to 
both domestic and external actors in simple and complex pieces can be seen as 
an overall indication of the complex nature of the debates taking place.  
The focus on the domestic and international personalities was not equally 
distributed over time. In December 2009 we noticed a strong presence of 
domestic personalities being named in the opinion pieces (75%), in contrast 
with 0 articles holding references exclusively to international personalities. In 
15 
 
May 2010 references to domestic persons remained high (63%) but we also see 
pieces that focus exclusively on specific international personalities (25%). This 
continued in June 2010, with exclusive references to international personalities 
overtaking references to domestic personalities (40% to 20% respectively). 
Following the intense deliberations at the European level between the Greek 
government and its creditors, opinion pieces reflected the entanglement of 
domestic personalities with specific international counterparts in 50% of the 
cases. During the elections of May and June 2012, we observed mentions to 
international personalities (36% and 58% respectively), while exclusive focus on 
domestic personalities dropped to 29% and then disappeared.  
Opinion pieces contained references to a number of political persons. We did not 
identify significant differences between simple and complex articles in the 
average number of persons mentioned (both around 2.5) but we did note 
interesting over-time patterns. In December 2009, about 60% of articles focused 
on single persons, while as the crisis unfolded links between two and five 
persons were drawn. The key domestic personalities were Prime Minister 
Papandreou (19%), ND leader Samaras (13%) and SYRIZA leader Tsipras (13%). 
From the international scene, highly featured personalities included German 
Chancellor Merkel (39%), French Presidents Sarkozy (13%) and Hollande 
(12%), and managing director of the IMF, Lagarde (4%).  
Of all references to Prime Minister Papandreou, about 23% appeared in 
December 2009. References peaked in November 2011 reaching 31%, and 
disappeared by June 2012. The peak can be attributed to his resignation during 
that month, whereas the decline in references reflects his exit from the party 
leadership of PASOK. On the other hand, ND leader Samaras emerged 
prominently after November 2011 (33%) as serious contender of the PM office, 
and continued to be featured in May and June 2012 (33% and 22% respectively) 
due to the performance of his party in the national elections. Along the same 
lines, Tsipras, the leader of SYRIZA, was hosted prominently in opinion pieces 
published between May and June 2012 (56% and 33% respectively) reflecting 
the strong performance of SYRIZA in the electoral contests of 2012.   
Merkel was the most prominent figure among international personalities. While 
she maintained a steadily increasing rate of appearance between December 2009 
and May 2012, references to her reached 33% by June 2012. According to the 
opinion pieces we examined, Merkel was frequently discussed as the person that 
controlled decision making and the future of the Eurozone. French president 
Sarkozy also showed a steady rise in references starting in December 2009 
(11%) to June 2010 (22%) through to November 2011 (33%) and then slowly 
faded in May and June 2012 when he no longer held his presidential position 
(22% and 11% respectively). His successor Francois Hollande took his place 
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effectively in May and June 2012, and Lagarde appeared as a key person, 
reflecting the high involvement of the IMF in the Greek case.  
Political institutions: domestic and international 
 
We counted the number of institution-related mentions in the opinion pieces 
between December 2009 and June 2012, and noted their presence in 65% of the 
total cases. International institutions were featured more prominently than 
domestic ones at every time point we examined, and in total 58% vs. 29%. The 
most balanced time points were June 2010 and November 2011 where mentions 
to domestic institutions rose significantly in comparison to previous and later 
months. We also noted that external institutions was prominently featured in the 
majority of simple (65%) and complex (52%) pieces, while complex pieces 
included also more combined mentions of internal and external institutions 
(20%) in comparison to simple pieces (5%) that took a one-sided approach most 
of the time. The over-exposure of international institutions reflects a general 
perception among opinion shapers of their prominent role in the crisis. The rise 
of domestic institution references between June 2010 and November 2011 is an 
indicator of opinion shapers’ disillusionment with the Greek program, the 
heightened public attention placed on the Greek parliament, and the call for 
elections.  
Emerging Stereotypes: the good, the bad and the ugly 
 
The central focus of our chapter involves the presentation stereotypes. A number 
of colorful references for Greece, Germany and the EU make their appearance in 
the opinion pieces, and more prominently in simple (58%) than complex pieces 
(42%). Stereotypes involving Greece and Germany were mentioned in about 
32% of the pieces, while stereotypes about the EU appeared in 13% of the 
articles. An overtime analysis of stereotype presentations is also interesting. In 
December 2009, Greece was mentioned as ‘small,’ and ‘undisciplined’ and 
Germany was presented as ‘the European giant’ and ‘powerful’. In May 2010, 
Greece was seen as ‘the weakest link of the Eurozone’ whereas Germany was 
described as ‘blooming’, ‘hostile’ and promoting a ‘German logic’. The EU also 
appeared this month, presented as ‘heartless’.  
In June 2010, stereotype words appeared more frequently. ‘Tax-evading’, 
‘cheating’, ‘unstable’, and ‘dangerous’ accompanied references to Greece, which 
was seen as the ‘necessary evil’ and the ‘black sheep of Europe’. The ‘Greek 
financial drama’ and the ‘detestable Greeks’ became part of the prominent 
discourse that was generated abroad and filtered down to the domestic public 
fora. On the other hand, Germany was seen as ‘bad’ and ‘cunning’, ‘hegemonic’ 
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and aggressive’ seeking to establish a ‘new German order’ in political and 
economic terms.  
In November 2011, the ‘Greek tragedy’ continued: the imported discourse of 
Greece as the ‘naughty child’ and the ‘laughing stock’ of Europe was challenged 
by domestic characterizations of Greece as the ‘scapegoat’. In addition, the 
imported stereotypes of ‘lazy’ and ‘cheating’ Greeks were countered by self-
perceptions of being ‘hard-working’ and ‘honest’. Germany maintained its 
‘ethnocentric’ and ‘aggressive’ image, being ‘strong’ and ‘dictatorial’. At the same 
time, perceptions of the EU carried the stigma of a ‘German-Europe’, overseen by 
a ‘silly Brussels elite’ which succumbed to ‘German domination’. This reaction 
can be linked to the stark threats coming from the EU about a potential Greek 
exit from the Eurozone, alongside additional pressures due to the pending 
referendum proposals put forward by the Greek Prime Minister. European 
counterparts were asking for guarantees on the Greek bailout and the 
sustainability of the Greek debt, frequently attacking the Greek tax-collection 
mechanisms and the disarray that was present in the Greek government’s 
actions regarding the implementation of the austerity program. 
May 2012 found Greek opinion shapers defending ‘the common soul’ of their 
country, countering imported stereotypes that marked Greeks as ‘beggars’, 
‘perpetual time wasters’, ‘lazy’ and ‘greedy’ with German stereotypes of 
‘hegemony’, ‘totalitarianism’ and ‘German world domination’. This again came as 
a reaction to international pressures (mostly from the EU) on the potential 
electoral victory of the so-called ‘anti-memorandum’ camp, which threatened the 
termination of payments servicing the sovereign debt, the declaration of 
bankruptcy and the return to the drachma—obviously with unforeseen 
consequences for the future of the Eurozone and the EU. 
In June 2012, a similar discourse war continued, with Greece as ‘a patient in 
comma’, ‘the victim’ and ‘experimental subject’ standing against ‘the engine of 
Europe’, the ‘aggressor’, the ‘inflexible’, ‘autocratic’ and ‘selfish’ Germany. The EU 
was presented as the ‘ugly foreigners’ of an ‘almost-dead’ Europe. The results of 
the Greek elections demonstrated the will of the voters to remain in the EU 
calling, at the same time, for a renegotiation of the bailout terms or at least the 
easing of the austerity measures (Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou, 2013).  
 
Responsibility attributions: who is to blame 
 
An analysis of the discussions around the Greek debt crisis cannot omit a review 
of blame attribution and accountability. We coded blame attributions towards 
government, opposition, the political system in general, external actors, a 
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combination of external and domestic actors, and finally interest groups. The 
first interesting finding is that most pieces adopt a single blame frame (48%) and 
only 3% of the pieces spread responsibility across four or more categories. In 
addition, simple pieces adopt predominantly single blame frames in 63% of the 
cases, while the majority of complex articles (48%) assign blame to 3 groups of 
actors.  
We also see that the blame spread across the categories is balanced. The political 
system is blamed 35% of the time, external actors about 34%, while the 
government, interest groups, and domestic and external institutions as a pair 
receive blame in about 32% of the opinion pieces each. The opposition is less 
prominently featured in the blame game, with references about 20% of the time, 
showing that even challengers are not perceived to be innocent bystanders in the 
Greek debt crisis. At first, this might appear going against the results by 
Vasilopoulou et al. (2014) who found that in the formal political discourses 
within parliament, the Government, the Opposition and the external elites where 
blamed by political leaders as perpetrators of the crisis. We see our findings as 
an interesting juxtaposition, which demonstrates a disillusionment of political 
discourses with media and public discourses and corroborates the presence of 
what is often described as a perceived gap between official political rhetoric and 
perceptions of opinion shapers and the public.  
Comparing patterns of blame frames featured in simple and complex articles, we 
identified that arguments attributing blame to the political system, the 
government, and the opposition were featured predominantly in complex 
articles (58%, 64% and 79% respectively), in contrast to simple articles (42%, 
36% and 21%). External actors or a combination of domestic and external were 
predominantly blamed in simple pieces (61% and 59%) in contrast to complex 
pieces (39% and 41%), and blame on interest groups was equally featured in 
simple and complex pieces (50% each).  
Peaks’ and ‘troughs’ of accountability are visible in our overtime analysis . The 
government received most blame references in December 2009, June 2010 and 
November 2011. Each of these months hosts about 23% of the total government 
blame references, which reflect time periods when the ball was in the 
government’s hands (e.g. requesting the bailout, responding to the protests and 
negotiating a referendum). Blame references to the opposition peaked in May 
2010 and November 2011 with about 29% of the total references appearing in 
each of these two months. This reflects the unwillingness to take responsibility 
for the bailout ratification and negotiating the terms of participating in a 
cooperation government respectively. The political system received 21% of its 
blame references in May 2010, 25% in June 2010, and 29% in May 2012, with 
much lower percentages in the other months. This reflects key moments when 
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the political system was not prepared to undertake responsibility for the crisis 
(May 2010) or was too fragmented to react (during the two elections).  
External actors (and mainly Germany) received about 9% of their blame 
references in December 2009, blame increased in May 2010 (17%) and topped 
in June 2010 at 30% of references, demonstrating responses from external 
actors on the crisis. November 2011 and May 2012 were quieter months for 
external actors, but June 2012 saw a flare-up of blame comments reaching 27%. 
This can be linked to the polarized discourse prevalent during election time.  
‘Domestic and external actors combined’ were targeted more prominently 
starting in November 2011 (36%) and in May 2012 (32%). By June 2012, blame 
attributions to domestic and external actors combined dropped to 23%. Finally, 
blame to interest groups was steady and frequent throughout. About 23% of 
references appeared in December 2009, and a similar percentage continued in 
May 2010. References decreased in June 2010 and November 2011 when focus 
was shifted to other actors. In May 2012 we noted an additional increase to 23%, 
but focus was shifted again away from international organizations by June 2012. 
The above are graphically represented in Graph 1.  
*** Please insert Graph 1 here *** 
Conclusions 
 
Our analysis of opinion pieces aimed at gaining insights on how the political 
debate around the financial crisis was structured by opinion shapers, public 
intellectuals and citizens, drawing parallels with recent studies that have 
examined media messages and political rhetoric.  
The majority of opinion pieces we examined promoted a simple and mostly 
negative account of the crisis. Whereas newspaper articles might offer a more 
balanced and in-depth analysis of the determinants and implications of the 
phenomenon, opinion pieces offered heated commentary of the sequence of 
events as they unfolded. This is in line with Neuman, Just and Cligler (1992) who 
showed that journalists focus more on the determinants and implications of 
conflict while audiences spend more time discussing human impact and the 
moral implications of the events.  
We also saw that attributions of responsibility and blame rested overall more 
heavily on government and prominent international actors rather than the 
opposition, contrasting what Vasilopoulou et al. (2014) found in their analyses of 
parliament-generated rhetoric. We argue this is because the focus of public 
attention and appetite for justice naturally concentrates around the incumbent 
20 
 
and international political actors that feature prominently at the center of the 
media stage. Judgments regarding the opposition are secondary, reserved for 
times when opposition parties assume power.  
Our analysis expands on the findings of Vasilopoulou et al. (2014). We saw that 
responsibility for ‘making things good again’ shifted differently in simple and 
complex pieces, with the later highlighting internal blame to domestic political 
elites and the government. Simple pieces featured frequent shifting of the blame 
to international and EU counterparts. This, in conjunction with the stereotypical 
characterizations of Germany and Merkel, the ambivalent stance towards France 
and its leaders, and the adopted self-victimization discourse that expanded to 
south European neighbors, allows us to put into context public attitudes towards 
the proposed and implemented strategies and measures to tackle the crisis. 
Because media and public agendas have implications for formal political actions 
by political elites, these findings can complement studies that examine 
governmental responses to the crisis over time.  
Media representations are often related to rise of populism and the increase of a 
discourse based on the ‘we are better than them’ argument or ‘we can do things 
better ourselves’. In turn, this can fuel sentiments of nationalism as it demarcates 
‘them’ and ‘us’; it can create a certain version of conspiracy politics; it can lower 
political trust to formal and informal political institutions both at the domestic 
and the European level; and at the end it can contribute to creating an inward-
looking society with increased internal social divisions. Our study of opinion 
pieces allowed us to make distinctions between simple and complex 
representations of public opinion regarding the financial crisis. As long as the 
crisis remains a reality for many European countries, threatening to solidify the 
revived North-South divisions in Europe, it is important to keep monitoring 
public attitudes expressed in media and interpersonal communications.  
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Appendix 
 
Table 1: Timeline of newspaper headlines and count of opinion pieces in 
the sample 
 
Dates Headlines Number of Opinion Pieces 
December 
2009 (phase A) 
‘Nightmarish Report on Social 
Security’ (Typos tis Kiriakis) 
‘The market suffocates’ (I 
Chora) 
5 
May 2010 
(phase A) 
‘Hunger and misery for 
salaried employees and 
pensioners’ (Avriani) 
‘People at the Guillotine’ (24 
Hours) 
‘In vain Sacrifice’ (I Vradyni) 
‘Suffocation for five stony 
years’ (Ethnos) 
7 
June 2011 
(phase B) 
‘Blood and Tears for 100 bns’ 
(Ta Nea) 
‘Four-year Tax Nightmare’ 
(Eleftherotypia) 
‘Coup de Grace to Salaried 
Employees and Pensioners’(I 
Vradyni) 
 ‘Massacre against the Greek 
People’ (Rizospastis) 
Panic (Democratia) 
13 
November 
2011 (Phase B) 
‘Gate of Hell’ (Democratia) 
‘Prince of Chaos’ 
(Eleftherotypia) 
‘Political Thriller’ 
(Aggelioforos) 
‘Earthquake in Europe’ 
(Avriani) 
‘Blackmail’ (Eleftheros Typos) 
14 
May 2012 
(Phase B) 
 ‘People’s Rage: Change the 
Memorandum’ (Eleftheros 
Typos) 
‘Thriller’ (I Vradyni) 
‘Black Dawn’ (Ethnos) 
16 
June 2012 
(Phase B) 
 
‘The Collaborators of Troika 
Kill Cancer-Patients’ (Avriani) 
‘Drama’ (Democratia) 
14 
Note: Selection of Headlines from Davou and Demertzis (2013).  
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Graph 1: Map of Blame Attributions during the Greek Debt Crisis 
 
 
Note: Cross-tabulation analysis. Data points represent % of blame references towards 
particular actors, present in each month  
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